




































zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
IZA Policy Paper No. 33
A Challenge for the G20:
Globally Stipulated Debt Brakes and Transnational 





A Challenge for the G20: 
Globally Stipulated Debt Brakes and 






IZA and University of Cologne 
 
Andreas Peichl 
IZA, University of Cologne, ISER and CESifo 
 
Klaus F. Zimmermann 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







The IZA Policy Paper Series publishes work by IZA staff and network members with immediate 
relevance for policymakers. Any opinions and views on policy expressed are those of the author(s) 
and not necessarily those of IZA. 
 
The papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of 
such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly 





A Challenge for the G20: 
Globally Stipulated Debt Brakes and Transnational 
Independent Fiscal Supervisory Councils 
 
Debt-to-GDP ratios have grown to unprecedented levels in many industrialized economies. 
This requires disciplined consolidation efforts which are, however, supposed to come now at 
the wrong time with the economic recovery being fragile. The countries forming the G20 need 
to make sure the long-term sustainability of public finances. Not least, this is indispensable in 
order to avoid a further spreading of the sovereign debt crisis. Against this background, we 
call for a global debt brake following the Swiss or German example which should be agreed 
upon in Cannes in early November 2011. The agreement on the debt brake should be 
binding – in contrast to previous expressions made at the G20-level to reduce government 
debt, as, for example, the Seoul Action Plan is lacking any binding character. Therefore, the 
debt brakes should be fixed in national constitutions and monitored by independent 
transnational fiscal councils. The fiscal councils could be located at the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and should conduct a regular 
evaluation of national budget plans in order to ensure that they meet the requirements 
stipulated by the debt brake. Through this global monitoring process, an early warning 
system could be developed with the aim to avoid sovereign debt crises and the resulting 
contagion risks among highly indebted countries in the future. 
 
In an economic and political environment which is characterized by large uncertainties 
concerning economic prospects and the fear of a potential spreading of the sovereign debt 
crisis, a global debt brake in combination with an independent transnational supervisory 
council would send a credible signal that a reduction of sovereign debt to sustainable levels 
is not further delayed into the future. Moreover, a well-designed debt brake ensures that the 
general government budget is balanced over the business cycle. Consequently, it is a more 
efficient instrument than the former Stability and Growth Pact for the Eurozone which in fact 
stipulated a ceiling for the budget deficit, but whose requirements regarding budget surpluses 
in good times were insufficient. This asymmetry is eliminated by those debt brakes which are 
in force in Switzerland and Germany. The new fiscal policy framework thus leaves enough 
room for discretionary fiscal policy and the workings of automatic stabilizers in an economic 
downturn.   
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addition,  the  debt  levels  are  expected  to  grow  further  over  the  next  decades  due  to 
demographic trends and population ageing (Eichengreen et al., 2011).  
There is the widespread view that at present the need for fiscal consolidation comes 
at  the  wrong  time.  Fiscal  austerity  usually  leads  to  slower  growth  and  might  increase 
unemployment (Ball et al., 2011). The weak economy and fear of a double dip recession 
have prompted Barack Obama’s administration to announce a new stimulus program, the 
American  Jobs  Act,  and  to  call  for  similar  programs  in  other  countries.  However,  the 
opposing argument is based on the view that increased uncertainty among consumers and 
investors  –  with  regard  to  economic  prospects  and  the  response  of  economic  policy  to 
overcome the sovereign debt crisis – might negatively impact the economy (see e.g. Bloom, 
2009,  and  Baker  etal.,  2011).  Following  this  argument,  consolidation  plans  which  are 









that  all  G20  countries  implement  a  debt  brake  in  order  to  stop  the  increase  of  global 5 
 
sovereign debt – including those developing countries with rather low levels of public debt 
today.  The  debt  brake  should  follow  the  German  or  Swiss  example,  augmented  by 
































Last  G20  summits  in  Toronto  and  Seoul:  commitments  and  current  state  of 
implementation 
The sovereign debt crisis was already on the agenda of the last two G20 summits in Toronto 







However,  the  current  situation  is  marked  by  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  about  the 








debt,  not  least  to  ease  international  financial  markets.  The  inability  of  governments  to 



















of  the  BRIC  countries  and  other  fast‐growing  economies.  Their  economies  would  be 
substantially affected by a spreading of the sovereign debt crisis and a resulting increasingly 
cloudy economic outlook. Moreover, it is their self‐interest which should restrain them from 
accumulating  debt  levels  as  high  as  in  the  advanced  economies.  For  these  reasons,  the 









  By  imposing  that  surpluses  have  to  be  generated  in  good  times,  pro‐cyclical 









































when  real  GDP  growth  is  negative.  For  the  crisis  years  2008‐2011,  we  consider  two 
scenarios.  Scenario  a)  simply  extrapolates  the  calculations  of  the  period  2001‐2007,  i.e. 
compliance with the Maastricht Treaty is assumed, whereas scenario b) is based on observed 











  A  comparison  of  actual  debt  /  GDP  ratios  in  2011  with  those  resulting  from  our 
hypothetical  calculations  shows  that  public  finances  would  be  much  healthier  today  if 
countries had complied with a budget rule such as the one of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Countries  such  as  Greece  and  Portugal  which  have  been  covered  by  stabilization 
mechanisms from the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission or Italy which faced an 
increase  in  its  sovereign  risk  premia  in  recent  months  due  to  insufficient  consolidation 





had  complied  with  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  In  some  cases  this  is  highly  implausible.  For 
example, in the Great Recession the Irish government was confronted with the collapse of its 



























































optimal  tax  models  is  usually  very  high  (above  60%)  even  when  taking  into  account 
behavioral responses (Aaberge and Colombino, 2010, and Bach et al. 2011). In addition, 
estate and inheritance taxes could be introduced or extended. Another policy instrument 






time  for  governments  to  commit  to  credible  long‐term  consolidation  is  now,  and  this 
commitment is needed even in the short‐term for the sake of increased confidence among 12 
 
consumers  and  investors  and  lower  sovereign  risk  premia.  The  debt  crisis  calls  for  a 
reduction of government debt to sustainable levels. Therefore, G20 countries should commit 
to enact a global debt brake following the Swiss or German example at their next meeting in 
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Country  2000  2007  2011  2007  2011a  2011b 
Austria  66  61  72  51  49  58 
Belgium  108  84  95  81  75  86 
Brazil  67  65  65  30  22  28 
Canada  82  67  84  52  49  60 
France  57  64  87  44  47  65 
Germany  60  65  83  53  53  58 
Greece  103  105  166  62  73  110 
India  72  73  62  33  18  45 
Indonesia  95  37  25  33  18  22 
Ireland  37  25  109  15  27  83 
Italy  109  104  121  87  90  100 
Japan  142  188  233  139  161  187 
Portugal  48  68  106  36  45  65 
Spain  59  36  67  31  36  60 
United Kingdom  41  44  81  28  31  58 
United States  55  62  100  39  42  74 
 
Source: IMF WEO September 2011 and own calculations 
Note: Table shows the observed debt‐to‐GDP ratios (in % of GDP) for 2000, 2007 and 2011 and the 
hypothetical government debt for 2007 and 2011 if countries had complied with the Maastricht rules 
from 2000 onwards: balanced budget if real GDP growth was positive, 3%‐deficit in case of negative 
real GDP growth, consideration of observed budget balances if they were above the requirements of 
the Maastricht Treaty. Scenario 2011b takes into account observed budget balances for the years 
2008‐2011. 
 